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Abstract 
Memory for visual objects, although typically highly accurate, can be distorted, especially in older 
adults. Here we asked whether also erroneous identifications of visual objects subsequently 
corrected and replaced by a correct identification might induce false recognitions, and whether this 
is more likely to occur in older people. For this aim a new paradigm was developed. In the first 
phase, participants performed a visual object identification task with degraded pictures of objects 
and produced correct and false but subsequently corrected identifications. In the second phase, 
participants performed a surprise recognition task in which also false identifications were presented. 
False identifications elicited false recognitions, with a stronger and more reliable effect in elderly 
participants, suggesting that correcting the initial visual error is not sufficient to correct the memory 
for the experience. Moreover, misidentification-related false recognitions coexisted in memory 
along with correct recognitions of correct identifications.  
These findings are discussed in relation with age-related deficits in memory updating and strategic 
retrieval. 
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1. Introduction  
The aim of this study is to assess the effect of erroneous identifications of visual objects on 
memory. It is well known that memory for visual material is excellent in humans (Shepard,1967; 
Standing, 1973; Standing et al., 1970) and more resistant to distortion than memory for verbal 
material (Koutstaal and Schacter, 1997; Koutstaal et al., 1999, 2001; Israel and Schacter, 1997). 
However, evidence has been reported suggesting that false recall and/or recognition may also occur 
with pictorial stimuli consisting of single visual objects (objects without any background setting or 
scene), and that this effect is more likely to occur in older than in younger adults (Balota et al., 
1999; LaVoie and Faulkner, 2000; Tun et al., 1998; for reviews, see Schacter et al., 1997, 1998).  
Moreover, several studies have shown that false memories are more likely to occur for 
objects that share perceptual and conceptual features with actually experienced objects. In 
particular, studies by Koutstaal and co-workers (Koutstaal and Schacter, 1997; Koutstaal et al., 
1999) found elevated rates of false recognition of lures which were new objects perceptually and 
conceptually similar to studied objects. The effect was stronger in older than younger adults (60-
70% in older vs 25-30% in younger, Koutstaal and Schacter, 1997; Koutstaal et al., 1999, 2001). 
The age effect was strongly attenuated when abstract novel objects, lacking any pre-existing 
semantic representations, were used as stimuli, and studied objects and lure shared perceptual (but 
not conceptual) similarity (Koutstaal at al., 2003). The higher vulnerability of older adults to false 
memories induced by perceptual and semantic association has been explained in terms of a 
“semantic categorization” account (Koutstaal et al., 2003). In situations in which both perceptual 
and conceptual information is present, as with concrete visual objects, older people primarily focus 
on the semantic information during the encoding, detracting from processing the item-specific 
perceptual information, and therefore increasing the risk of “gist-based” errors.  
More recent studies have shown that mental imagery, either intentionally and experimentally 
induced in a controlled way, or spontaneously generated in a laboratory setting, can also lead people 
 3 
to believe that an event that they imagined had actually occurred. In both conditions high-
confidence memory confusions were observed (Foley et al., 1991; Henkel et al., 1998; Weinstein 
and Shanks, 2010). Specifically, Henkel et al. (1998; see also Henkel and Franklin, 1998) found that 
it is more likely to falsely remember seeing the drawing of non-presented objects when participants 
who were requested to imagine line drawings of objects also saw drawings of objects shaped 
similarly to the imagined ones. This effect was obtained in both young and older adults, although it 
was greater in the latter group (Henkel et al., 1998). Mental images might also arise spontaneously 
during encoding and be later mistaken for memories of real perceptual experiences (Foley et al., 
1991; Foley and Foy, 2008; Foley et al., 2007).  
In the present study we assessed the occurrence of a new type of false memories for visual 
objects, which might be quite important in everyday and eyewitness memory situations. We asked 
whether misidentifications of visual objects (e.g. a drill mistaken for a hair-dryer) which are 
subsequently corrected and replaced by a correct identification, might nonetheless generate false 
memories, and whether this effect is stronger in older than in younger adults. This is not the same 
question as asking whether people develop false memories after imagination. When memory 
distortions are due to imagination, a mental content is created and mistaken for something 
experienced. Here instead we are interested in what happens to the memory of a visual object when 
the initial error in perceiving it is corrected and perceptually replaced with the correct identification. 
Would the initial erroneous identification still be remembered as an object actually presented?  
Errors often occur during the visual identification of objects. Although we know that 
humans have a remarkable ability to quickly and accurately identify and categorize visual objects, 
yet there are several conditions in everyday life in which the visual input is relatively impoverished 
and people make false identifications. Consider, for example, being requested to identify a visual 
object rapidly moving in space (e.g. an animal or vehicle) or located at the periphery of the visual 
field. In these cases, only low spatial frequencies are available, making it possible to identify only 
the global configuration, the skeleton of the object. This increases the risk of mistaking the object 
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presented with another object that has a similar global shape (Vannucci et al., press). For example, 
it is rather likely to falsely identify the silhouette of a drill as a hair dryer, if the visual figure lacks 
internal local details. However, most of the times these initial errors are corrected by a second look 
(e.g. a look in more central vision or with longer exposure), that allows us to realize what the 
correct object is (“I thought it was a hair dryer but it is a drill”). We ask what happens to the 
misidentification after the correct object is identified. If correcting the initial visual error is not 
sufficient to update and correct the memory for the experience, then even after the correction the 
original erroneous identification might still persist in memory, generating a misidentification-
related false memory. Referring to our previous example, a person who has seen a hair dryer in the 
silhouette of a drill might still remember a hair-dryer as one of the visual objects presented, which 
would indicate that correcting the initial visual error was not sufficient to update the memory for the 
initial experience and subsequently reject the misidentification as erroneous.  
Moreover, if a misidentification creates a false memory, what happens to the memory of the 
correct identification? Do misidentifications coexist in memory along with correct identifications of 
the same objects, or do they interfere with the memory for correct identifications? To clarify, if a 
participant made the false perception “hair-dryer ” for the object “drill” (final correct identification) 
and then falsely recognized the item “hair-dryer” as “old”, would the same participant also 
recognize the correct item “drill” as old ? Or would the false recognition of hairdryer prevent the 
possibility of correctly recognizing it?  
To address these questions, in the study we developed an incidental memory paradigm, 
consisting of two phases. In the first phase, participants performed a visual object identification task 
with degraded pictures of photographs of real-life visual objects. For each object, nine spatially-
filtered versions were presented in an ascending order of filtering (degradation), that started from 
the most blurred and degraded version (level 1) to which new ranges of high spatial frequencies 
were added until the original/complete resolution version was achieved (level 9). Both false 
identifications and subsequent correct identifications were recorded.  
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In the second phase, participants performed a surprise recognition task. Words were 
presented instead of pictures. Some of the words referred to the names of studied objects (“old” 
words), some referred to new objects belonging to the same semantic categories of the studied 
objects (i.e. animals, tools, vehicles, vegetables and fruit, kitchen utensils, and musical instruments 
(“new” words), and the last group referred to false identifications of the presented objects, 
subsequently self-corrected during the identification task (“false identifications”). To verify whether 
the initial false identifications and the subsequent correct identifications might coexist in memory, 
in the task we also included, for each false identification, the word referring to the final correct 
identification. 
As previous studies have shown that older people are more prone to false memories for 
visual objects than young people, we compared recognition in two groups, one of young adults and 
one of older adults. Task difficulty and overall performance in the recognition task were equated 
between the two groups, by introducing a longer delay between the identification task and the 
memory task in the younger group. The delay was determined by pilot data.  
 
2. Methods  
2.1. Participants 
Participants were 23 younger adults (mean age = 21 years, sd= 2.11 years, range: 19-24; 14 
female and 9 male) and 23 older adults (mean age = 71.09 years, sd= 2.15, range: 68-75; 15 female 
and 8 male). All participants, which were native Italian speakers, were right-handed, with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing. They were naïve regarding the goals and details of 
the experiment. Young participants were undergraduates of the Faculty of Psychology, enrolled in 
courses at bachelor and master levels. Older participants were recruited from an existing database of 
healthy individuals enrolled in courses at the “Università dell’Età Libera” of Firenze, or through 
local social clubs. All participants were screened for depression and they were individually 
interviewed, so as to exclude those with any of the following conditions: substance and alcohol 
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abuse, neurologic and cardiovascular diseases, current treatment with psychoactive medication, 
current or previous treatment for psychiatric illness, and for older participants only, primary 
degenerative brain disorders (e.g. Parkinson's disease, AD, Huntington's disease).  
Because of previous studies showing that time of the day is an important variable in older 
adults’ cognitive performance, including the likelihood of creating false memories (Intons-Peterson 
et al, 1999), in a earlier testing all older participants were also given the Morningness-Eveningness 
Questionnaire (MEQ, Horne and Ostberg, 1976; Italian adaptation in Mecacci and Zani, 1983) 
assessing their optimal (preferred) time of day. MEQ scores revealed that most older participants 
were morning people. All participants were tested within their optimal time frame. All older 
participants had Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) scores above or equal 29, and an average 
of 14,96 years (sd = 2.50) of formal education (in the younger group average education was 14.74 
years; sd = 2.03).  
 
2.2.Stimuli   
Stimuli for the identification task consisted of 90 spatially-filtered versions of grey-level 
photographs of real-life objects, taken from a standardized set of pictures (Viggiano et al., 2004), 
belonging to the following semantic categories: animals, vegetables and fruit, kitchen utensils, 
tools, vehicles and musical instruments. Each of the 90 object photographs was submitted to nine 
different levels of spatial filtering following a coarse-to-fine order that gradually integrated spatial 
information. Stimuli in the photographs were blurred by removing various ranges of spatial 
frequencies from the original spectrum of the image. This filtering process created a multiresolution 
representation of the original images (scanned at the resolution of 300 dpi). The multi-resolution 
filter selected was the Gaussian mask that performs a low-pass filtering (for more details on the 
filtering procedure, see Vannucci et al., 2001).  
 
2.3. Procedure 
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The procedure consisted of two phases, an identification phase in which all participants were 
exposed to the stimuli and asked to identify them and a test phase that followed after a retention 
interval. In the test phase all participants performed a recognition task of the names of the stimuli 
presented. The delay between the identification and memory phases was 30-min for older 
participants. To equate overall performance and task difficulty between young and older adults, a 5-
hours delay was inserted for young participants, the duration of which was determined by pilot data. 
Participants were tested individually.  
Identification phase 
In the identification phase, participants were shown 90 spatially-filtered grey-levels photographs of 
real life objects. For each object, nine spatially-filtered versions were presented in an ascending 
order of filtering, that started from the most blurred (level 1), and then adding new ranges of high 
spatial frequencies until the original resolution version was shown (level 9). The order of 
presentation of the nine levels (from most blurred to most complete and clear) was always the same 
across objects and individuals. Each stimulus was presented for 200 ms, in the canonical orientation 
(Vannucci and Viggiano, 2000; Viggiano and Vannucci, 2002) on the centre of a PC screen. Each 
stimulus subtended a visual angle of 7.58 high by 7.58 wide, on average. Each picture was 
presented at all nine resolution levels regardless of the level at which it was actually identified 
(Vannucci et al., 2001; Viggiano et al., 2007) (Figure 1).  After each picture, an X appeared in the 
center of the screen (as fixation point) and remained until the experimenter pressed a button. 
The presentation order of the 90 stimuli was randomized for each participant and then 
divided into three blocks. The interval between blocks was of 2-3 minutes, to make the task feasible 
for older participants. 
The task was to identify and name each objects. Participants were requested to respond after 
each level of a given stimulus was presented, indicating whether or not they could identify the 
stimulus, and providing a name if they felt that they could. The next level was presented only after a 
response was made. Participants were given feedback on the correctness of each identification. 
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Participants were told in advance that superordinate names (e.g., response ‘‘animal’’ for a 
picture of horse) were not acceptable. The correctness of the name assigned to the object was 
established according to the results of a previous normative study, in which dominant and non-
dominant names for each picture were reported (Viggiano et al., 2004). Responses that differed 
from the dominant and non-dominant names and that referred to a different object were considered 
false identifications (e.g., responding ‘‘dog’’ for the picture of a fox). In case of a false 
identification, participants were told that their response was incorrect and that they should try to 
identify the object correctly on subsequent (more complete) presentations of the stimulus. 
Both correct and false identifications were audio-recorded and the level at which they 
occurred was recorded manually. The identification task was preceded by a practice trial with two 
stimuli. Although participants were instructed to avoid wild guessing, they were asked to say out 
loud the name of objects they believed they could identify in the picture. These instructions were 
given in order to avoid hesitations (especially in the older group) which would have hidden the 
presence of false identifications. 
Recognition phase 
In the test phase, after a 30-min (older adults) or a 5-hours delay (young adults), participants 
were asked to perform a surprise recognition task. For the task, a list of words was presented 
verbally by the experimenter. The list consisted of 20 words referring to the names of the objects 
shown during the identification phase (“old”), 20 words referring to the names of objects not shown 
during the identification phase but belonging to the same categories as the presented objects 
(“new”), and a variable number (ranging from 7 to 11) of words referring to the erroneous 
identifications made by the individual participant (“false identifications”).  
During phase 1, some participants made multiple misidentifications of the same item. These 
were relatively common in both older (18/23) and younger (21/23) adults. However, in the 
subsequent test of memory we included only one misidentification per item. 
New words were matched in familiarity (measured in terms of frequency of use, De Mauro 
 9 
et al., 1993) with presented object names, and care was taken that the new words did not refer to 
names of false identifications made by the participants in the identification phase. “False 
identifications” refer to the misidentifications made by the participants, and each participant was 
presented only with his/her own misidentification words. Although the number of words selected as 
false identifications differed across participants (7 to 11), younger and older adults did not differ in 
the average number of false identifications presented in the recognition task (younger, M = 9.57, ds 
= 1.47 ; older M = 9.26; ds = 1.42). We remind that all false identifications selected for the 
recognition phase referred to misidentifications that were later corrected during the identification 
task. 
In order to verify whether the initial false identifications and the subsequent correct 
identifications might coexist in memory, or whether false memories for the misidentifications 
interfered with the memory for correct identifications (even if these latter occur at after 
misidentifications), for each specific false identification made by each participant in the recognition 
task in the 20 ‘old’ words we included the word referring to the final correct identification. In the 
list, the words were presented in a pseudo-random order. The word referring to a specific false 
identification and its related correct identification were presented with at least 5 interposing words 
and no more than 2 consecutive words of the same type (i.e. old, false identifications, and new) 
were presented. 
The participants were requested to decide, for each word, whether it referred to an object 
“shown on the computer screen” (old) during the identification phase, or to an object “that had not 
been presented before” or to a mistake (false identification) in phase 1.  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Identification Phase  
Both younger and older adults were highly accurate in the visual object identification task, 
providing a final correct identification for 97.8% and 96.3% respectively. 2.2% and 3.7% (the 
 10 
percentages refer to younger and older adults respectively) of the figures were never correctly 
identified, even after all nine levels had been presented. No significant difference was found 
between the two groups in the mean level of filtering at which the first correct identification 
occurred (younger, 4.88; older, 4.75).  
Considering all misidentifications made (more than one misidentification could be made for 
the same object), the total number was higher for older (26.78) than for younger adults (21.17) [t 
(44) = 2.34, p = .024].   
 
3.2. Recognition phase 
Mean and standard deviation of hit rates (correct recognitions), false alarms to false 
identifications and false alarms to new items in younger and older participants are presented in 
Table 1. Two separate analyses were carried out, one on correct recognitions and one on the two 
types of false alarms (for new items and for false identifications).  
For correct recognitions both younger and older participants reported a high proportion of 
correct “old” responses (younger, .89; older, .90) and no statistically significant difference between 
the two groups was found at the t-test (t < 1). The same pattern was found after correcting 
recognition score for false alarms to new items (which provided a baseline level of responding 
“old” to new items) (younger, .87; older, .86) (t < 1). These findings confirmed that the procedure 
we employed to equate the overall performance of the two groups was successful. 
Since the proportion of false alarms to false identifications and false alarms to new items 
were not normally distributed, a non-linear transformation of the data (arcsin) was used. A 2 x 2 
mixed model ANOVA was carried out on the arcsin of proportion of false alarms with Item Type 
(new items vs. false identifications) as the within-subjects factor and Group (younger vs. older 
adults) as the between-subjects factor. The effect of Item type was significant [ F (1, 44) = 26.45, p 
< .0001]. Post-hoc Bonferroni revealed that participants made significantly more false alarms to 
false identifications (.060) than to new items (.023) (p < .0001). The effect of Group was significant 
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[ F (1, 44) = 8.45, p <.01]. Older adults made significantly more false alarms (.053) than younger 
adults (.029). However, the main effects were qualified by a significant Group x Item Type 
interaction [ F (1, 44) = 5.37, p < .05]. Post hoc t-tests revealed that critical false alarms (false 
alarms for false identifications) were significantly higher for older (.08) than younger adults (.040) [ 
t (44) = 3.14, p < .005], while there was no significant difference between the two groups in false 
alarms for new items (.026 in older and .019 in younger). 
To control for the tendency to make random false alarms, we calculated a conditional 
probability for the critical false-alarms over the total number of false-alarms (both the critical false-
alarms and the false-alarms on the new items). The conditional probability was computed following 
Field (2005) for the treatment of missing data. In this case too a non-linear transformation (arcsin) 
of these values was used. At the t test the difference between older (.07) and younger adults (.036) 
for false identifications remained significant even when critical false alarms were corrected for the 
tendency to make random false alarms [ t (44) = 3.05, p < .005].  
Since older adults reported a higher number of false identifications in the visual 
identification task, and this might affect the probability of making recognition errors for false 
identifications, to control for this effect, a 2 x 2 mixed model ANCOVA was carried out on the 
arcsin of the proportion of false alarms with Item Type (new items vs false perceptions) as the 
within-subjects factor, Group (younger vs. older adults) as the between-subjects factor, and the total 
number of false identifications as covariate. 
The effect of Group was significant [ F (1, 43) = 9.29, p <.005]. Older adults made 
significantly more false recognitions (.054) than younger adults (.028). The Group x Item Type 
interaction was also significant [ F (1, 43) = 4.34, p < .05]. Post hoc t tests confirmed the results of 
the initial ANOVA, that false alarms for false identifications in the older group significantly 
exceeded those in the younger group [ t (44) = 3.14, p < .005], while there was no significant 
differences between the two groups in false alarms to new items.  
In line with this age effect, a significant difference between the two groups was also found 
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in the percentage of subjects who reported at least one critical false alarm (χ2= 4.85; p = .05).  
Percentages were 52% in younger participants and 82.6% in the group of older adults. On the 
contrary, no significant difference between the two groups was found in the percentage of subjects 
who committed at least one false recognition to new items (39.1% in younger and 43.5% in older 
adults) (χ2 = .090, p = .77). 
Finally, we verified whether false alarms to false identifications coexisted with correct 
recognitions (recognizing the correct identification). To clarify, consider the case in which one 
participant made the false identifications “hair-dryer” for the object “drill” (final correct 
identification) and then falsely recognized the word “hair-dryer” as “old”. In this case, the aim is to 
assess whether the same participant would also recognize the correct word “drill” or whether the 
false recognition of hair-dryer would prevent the possibility of correctly recognizing the word 
“drill”. For the analysis we calculated the proportion of correct recognition for the items for which 
critical false alarms were made (e.g. correctly recognising “drill” as old while also falsely 
recognizing “hair-dryer” as old for the same object) in the subgroup of participants who reported at 
least one critical false alarm to false perceptions (n= 31, 12 younger and 19 older adults). The 
proportion of correct recognition for items for which at least one critical false alarm was made was 
very high (.93). In 27 out of the 31 participants in this group the proportion of correct recognition in 
the presence of false recognition was 100%.  
The Mann–Whitney non-parametric test for two independent samples confirmed that 
younger and older adults did not differ significantly in the proportion of correct recognition in the 
presence of false alarms for false identifications (.88 in younger and .97 in older adults) (p =.73). 
In the same group of 31 participants (who had at least one false alarm for false identifications in the 
recognition task) the proportion of correct recognition which coexisted with false alarms for false 
identifications for the same object was compared with the proportion of correct recognition in the 
absence of false alarms for false identifications for the same object (e.g. correct recognition of 
“drill” as old, and correct rejection of “hair-dryer” for the same object), which was .95 (ds = .08). 
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The paired-t test revealed no significant differences between the two proportions. The result of this 
comparison suggests that the probability of correctly recognising an item as “old” was not affected 
by erroneously endorsing during the recognition test the misidentification(s) of the same object.  
 
4. Discussion 
In the present study we investigated whether misidentifications of visual objects, 
subsequently corrected and replaced by correct identifications, might induce false memories, and 
whether the effect is stronger in older than younger adults. We also tested whether 
misidentifications coexist in memory along with correct identifications of the same objects, or if 
they interfere with the memory for correct identifications. Our results show that false identifications 
of visual objects, although subsequently corrected, induced false recognitions in both younger and 
older adults. In both groups false recognitions for misidentifications were higher than false 
recognitions for new items, but older participants reported more false recognitions to false 
identifications than younger adults, although the two groups showed essentially equivalent correct 
recognition rates, and false alarms rates for new objects. Thus, the effect in older adults was specific 
for false recognition for misidentifications. That older adults were more susceptible than young 
adults to false recognitions for false identification was also confirmed by the higher percentage of 
older adults who reported at least one false recognition for misidentifications (82% in older group 
vs 52% in younger group). This result suggests that the effect in older adults is not only stronger 
than in younger adults, in quantitative terms, but it is also more consistent and reliable. The larger 
variability in false recognition for misidentifications observed in older adults than in younger adults 
was not due to a few individuals who had high levels of false memories.  
Moreover, erroneously remembering misidentification(s) of a visual object did not affect the 
probability of recognising the correct identification of the same object as “old”, suggesting that 
false memories for misidentifications and memories for the correct identification of the same object 
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co-exist in memory, and fallaciously recognizing one as correct is not an obstacle for properly 
classifying the second one as equally correct.  
Two different explanations, that are not mutually exclusive, might be advanced for these 
effects. On one hand, the failure might arise during encoding, and might concern memory 
correction and updating. When an erroneous visual identification (misidentification) is corrected, 
people should correct and update their original memory for the stimulus and remember the old 
erroneous identification as an error connected with that specific stimulus. If the memory updating 
processes fails, then the memory for the misidentification is never corrected and the response 
remains in memory as a correct response. As it has been found in previous studies, memory 
updating although rather efficient in younger adults, become weaker and more prone to error with 
age (Adrover-Roig and Barcelo, 2010; De Beni and Palladino, 2004) and this would explain why 
the effect is substantially reduced in younger people and definitely present in older adults.  
Whereas in the present study a significant difference in critical false memories was obtained 
between older and younger adults, in a study that presented a similar structure (Guillory  and 
Geraci, 2010) the authors did not find any age-related difference in the ability to correct the false 
inference made during reading. The similarity between the two studies consists in the fact that in 
both experiments the participants inferred something about the stimuli, which proved to be incorrect 
later, and both works addressed the age-related ability to inhibit/correct that wrong inference. The 
discrepancy in results between the two studies is interesting as it provides information about the 
mechanism by which the age-related deficit emerges. For example, one may reasonably exclude the 
possibility of a general inhibition deficit for older adults because they did inhibit their own false 
inferences in the case of reading (as younger adults did) in the study by Guillory and Geraci (2010), 
although they did not inhibit erroneous perceptions in the current study. This difference then 
stresses the possibility that specific and independent inhibitory processes are differently affected by 
the cognitive decline observed with aging.  
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Another possible explanation, however, is that the failure arises at the time of retrieval and 
testing. People might encode the events in a correct way, updating memory for misidentifications 
adequately, but they may not be able to successfully access and/or use in an appropriate and 
effective way this information under deliberate retrieval conditions. Previous studies have shown 
that retrieval failures are more pronounced in older than young adults (e.g. Koutstaal, 2003), and 
source monitoring errors during retrieval are more frequent in older than younger adults, (e.g. 
Schacter et al., 1991, 1997), resulting from the adoption of a more liberal decisional criterion and/or 
from deficits in using associative information in source monitoring (e.g. Chalfonte and Johnson, 
1996; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2003). In our data, however, the criterion adopted by older adults 
(.02) was not significantly different from the criterion adopted by the younger group (-.01), making 
the explanation based on criterion change less viable. 
One problem in interpreting these data might arise by the fact that in principle there might 
be a large variability in the number of times participants provide the correct response to a picture 
(e.g. they could say “A drill”  between 1 and 9 times in each given trial).  However our results show 
that older and younger participants made the first correct identification at very similar levels, on 
average 4.88 and 4.75 respectively and that the actual variability is rather low (SD =.46 in the 
pooled sample). We also examined the correlation between the level of first correct identification 
and the probability of making false memories. The result was not significant (r = .17).  An 
additional exploration of the data shows that there is only one individual who provided a correct 
identification before level 4 in the whole sample. Therefore, we do not believe that the actual 
variability affects the likelihood of making false memories. 
Future studies in which encoding and retrieval are directly manipulated will help distinguish 
between these explanations and will provide information about the specific mechanisms at play. 
One important question is whether the same or different mechanisms are involved in young and 
older adults in producing false memories for self-corrected misidentifications. While in the present 
study we found a quantitative difference in misidentification-related false memories between young 
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and older adults, our data cannot tell whether the difference is also qualitative (e.g. in 
remember/know judgments). False memories created by self-corrected misidentifications might be 
driven by an error in recollection and reflect a genuine illusory memory, or they might be the result 
of increased familiarity. Future studies should explore the extent to which these two variables play a 
role in errors observed in young and older adults.  
The low level of false alarms to new items excludes two other possible explanations of the 
results. We can rule out that false recognitions for misidentifications are induced by semantic 
associations and perceptual overlap with old items (Koutstaal and Schacter, 1997), since both new 
items and misidentifications are semantically related to, or share features of, items that had 
previously been studied. We can also rule out another possible mechanism, i.e. that false 
recognitions for misidentifications depend on the adoption of a “plausibility” strategy rather than 
direct retrieval strategy during the test phase, a strategy that seems to be at play during retrieval 
(Mazzoni, 2007; Mazzoni and Hanczakowski, in press; Reder et al., 1986). The plausibility strategy 
is a metacognitive rather then a memorial strategy, and assumes that evaluating a mental content as 
highly plausible in relation to the task at hand enhances the likelihood of volunteering it as a 
memory. In the present study critical false alarms were all on highly plausible misidentifications, 
suggesting that the plausibility strategy might be responsible for them. However, the new items 
were as plausible as the false identifications, ruling then out this possible explanation. 
Since critical false alarms (false alarms for misidentifications) were relatively infrequent in 
both groups, one might question the psychological significance of this age-related difference. 
However,  in spite of their relative rarity,  in older adults critical false alarms were present at least 
once in every individual (the two groups differed in the mode for critical false alarms, which was 0 
(no critical false alarms) in young adults and 1 (at least 1 false alarm) in older adults). 
Misremembering then occurred for at least in 10% of the erroneous identifications that had been 
later self-corrected  (the maximum number of misidentifications presented in the recognition task 
was 11). These critical false alarms then represent a relatively constant error that occurs in older 
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adults. Moreover, in the present study, each stimulus was presented 9 times during the identification 
phase and the interval between the two phases was quite short. Both conditions are quite unusual 
and unlikely to occur outside a laboratory and we would expect a  stronger effect when sub-optimal 
and more ecological conditions are used. 
Our results have important implications for everyday life functioning, especially in older 
adults. Finding that self-corrected misidentifications are still remembered as correct visual elements 
has important applied implications for example in eyewitness testimony, as it suggests that an 
erroneous initial identification might still affect the memory for the original event even after the 
error has been corrected. When describing a crime, elements might still be reported to the police 
even if they were not there, if these elements are the result of misidentifications of objects that were 
in the scene. Similarly, initial erroneous identifications of individuals might be responsible for 
persisting erroneous recognitions, even when witnesses become aware that the initial identification 
was wrong.  
Examining the effect of spontaneous visual misidentifications offers a new and more 
ecological way to assess how spontaneous false memories occur in everyday life. A recent study on 
non-believed memories (Mazzoni et al., 2010) has shown for example that approximately 25% of 
the population reports at least one memory for an event that was later realized had not occurred. 
Now we know that, besides imagination and suggestion, also visual misidentifications, even when 
self-corrected, can give rise to false memories. 
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Legends 
 
Table 1: Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) of correct recognitions (hits), false recognitions 
to false identifications and false recognitions to new items in younger and older adults. 
 
Figure 1: Examples of an ascending sequence of nine filtering levels of two stimuli (donkey and 
toothbrush) 
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Table 1 
 
 
 
Measure Younger 
adults 
Older 
adults 
Correct recognitions (hits) .89 
(.08) 
.90 
(.08) 
False recognitions to false identifications .08 
(.09) 
.21 
(.19) 
False recognitions to new items .02 
(.03) 
.04 
(.06) 

